Why We're Polarized

Why We’re Polarized is an all-encompassing book which merges ideas from history, psychology, political science, demography, and media studies to explain why American politics went from the incredibly depolarized mid-20th century, when the American Political Science Association (APSA) complained there was not a meaningful difference between Democrats and Republicans, to the hyperpolarized present, with liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans.

1. History. The mid-20th century was always an aberration, with a hidden 4 party system inside the 2 major parties: liberal Democrats, Dixiecrats, conservative Republicans, and Rockefeller Republicans. The Dixiecrats and Rockefeller Republicans were regional factions whose associations with Democrats and Republicans were historic rather than ideological. These associations broke down as the Democrats became the party of civil rights and Republicans courted Southerns.
2. Psychology. Humans are social creatures which naturally sort themselves into groups. Klein cites studies where subjects, who didn’t know each other, automatically grouped themselves based on arbitrary test scores or taste in art, which themselves were a lie. Once divided into in-groups and out-groups, us-vs-them thinking takes over. In the same study, when distributing money, subjects preferred to give more for their in-group and less for their out-group. Subjects even gave less to their in-group if it meant maximizing the gap between the in-group and out-group. As our identities increasingly align into broader political mega-identities, psychology predicts that group conflict will increase.
3. Political science. The Democratic Party of the 21st century is a big tent coalition of diverse interest groups while the Republican Party of the 21st century is much more ideological. Importantly, the Democratic Party has retained its moderates—Klein cites that only half of Democrats self-identified as liberals—while “moderate” Republicans like Dick Cheney or George W. Bush have disappeared since 2008. The asymmetric politics of the 2 parties prevents Democrats from becoming as untethered as the Republican Party.
4. Demography. America is browning. The non-hispanic white population is in relative decline. Eventually, it will lose its majority status in the 2040s, although it will still be the largest racial/ethnic group. America is also secularizing. In 2021, fewer than half of Americans—47%—were members of a religious institution such as a church, synagogue, or mosque. The dominant culture in America has been white and Christian, both of which are in decline. Demographic change makes people more conservative. Whites told that they were losing numerical majority were much more likely to support the Republican Party and conservative policies more generally.
5. Media studies. The mid-20th century media market was dominated by monopolies: local newspapers held media monopolies over cities while the ABC, NBC, and CBS broadcasting networks held national media monopolies. These monopolies served politically diverse audiences, maintaining journalistic rigor to have broad appeal. However, the rise of cable TV and later the internet broke up the mass media landscape into distinct information bubbles. The left relies on “mainstream media”—the NYTimes, PBS, and CNN—while the right pays attention to conservative media: conservative talk shows, Fox News, and now alt-right podcasts.

Polarized politics has been devastating for good governance. Voters are sticky, consistently voting for the same party election after election. Elections are swung by a small sliver of independents who do still change their votes between elections. This makes elections extremely close, especially compared to the landslides which were common in the past. It’s impossible for parties to win overwhelming majorities. Because elections are so close, there is no incentive for the party out of power to work with the party in power to pass registration. By sabotaging the party in power, they can hurt their public approval and, potentially, win back power in the next election.

Klein has few solutions for our polarized politics. He accepts that polarization is here to stay rather than argue for a depolarized politics. Instead, he argues that political institutions need to reform to function better admits polarization. Removing the debt ceiling makes it less likely that routine budget fights lead a default, crashing the global economy. Removing the filibuster allows political conflict to be settled with a vote, allowing politicians and the public to move on, rather than be debated endlessly. He also proposed more radical political reform which has no chance of happening: changing how House Representatives are chosen, switching to a popular vote for the presidency through the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, and limiting Supreme Court justices to long but finite terms.

The book has aged well since its publication. The Republican Party has doubled down on its racism and xenophobia. The MAGA faithful contort themselves to support whatever policy position Trump currently takes. The rise of TikTok with its legendarily good recommendation algorithm divides users into bubbles even more than Facebook or Twitter does.

Yet, in one way, it has aged poorly. Following the 2024 election, the cleavages in politics no longer appear to be race. Trump has increased his share of the non-white vote all 3 elections. It appears to be education—college educated voters are Democrats while those without a college degree are Republican—and gender—women are liberal while men are conservative. The policy fights are more dramatic. No longer are there fights over healthcare or taxes but the entire political establishment, defended by Democrats, attacked by Republicans. Nowhere in Why We’re Polarized is there any hint of these possible changes.